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ESSAY: TORQUEMADA AND UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION APPEALS
William W. Milligan*
The premise of this Essay is that unemployment compensation
appeals hearings take the form of inquests rather than follow the
traditional adversarial model. Given this, the hearing officer car-
ries a special burden of ensuring that due process is afforded.
State review systems should structure the process so that the
difference, along with the unique burden, is made explicit.
A Dark Image
A terrifying image of the Inquisition, personified by Torque-
mada, Grand Inquisitor of Spain, has come down to us through
history. A powerful, if apocryphal, account of Torquemada is
included in Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov.1 In a
chapter entitled "The Grand Inquisitor," Dostoyevsky writes,
"My story is laid in Spain, in Seville, in the most terrible time
of the Inquisition, when fires were lighted every day to the
glory of God, and 'in the splendid auto da fg the wicked here-
tics were burnt.' ,
2
Twentieth century America is not, of course, the same as
fifteenth century Spain. Here, as in all modern democratic
societies, the sinister practices of the Inquisition have been
eliminated from the legal system. Heretics are no longer
burned at the stake. Confessions are not extracted by torture.
Hearings are open, and due process is enforced.
In spite of these changes, a dark image remains associated
with the inquisitorial process. The witch hunts in Salem,
Massachusetts, in 1692, serve as a symbol of the excesses of
Inquisition-style justice.' In more recent times the word
"inquisition" in America has acquired a special meaning
derived from the original. This new meaning has been applied
* Chairman, Ohio Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. A.B. 1948,
Hiram College; J.D. 1951, University of Michigan Law School.
1. FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZov (Constance Garnett
trans., Random House 1945) (1880).
2. Id. at 294-95.
3. 29 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA, INTERNATIONAL EDITION Witches 84 (1995).
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to "witch hunts" for persons holding or expressing nonconform-
ing opinions, and in particular to activities associated with the
late Senator Joseph McCarthy.4 As a result of these modern
associations, the term "inquisitorial" continues to have a pejor-
ative connotation. 5
The courts have underscored this connotation by assuming,
in certain cases, that activity so characterized violates the
Constitution. For example, Justice Marshall commented that,
"[blecause the court below failed to examine fully whether
petitioner's confession was obtained by inquisitorial means
condemned by the Due Process Clause, I would grant certiora-
ri."6 In the 1896 Supreme Court case of Brown v. Walker,' the
Court observed that the maxim that no one shall be required
to be a witness against himself "had its origin in a protest
against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of
interrogating accused persons."8 The most familiar case in this
area is that of Miranda v. Arizona.9 The Supreme Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Warren, found the evidence
obtained to be inadmissible because it resulted from question-
ing which might be inquisitorial."°
A Respected Tradition
These modern characterizations overlook the fact that the
inquisitorial process has a respected, as well as a discredited,
tradition. The inquisitorial structure was an important part of
Roman law. The classic Roman author, Cicero, used the term
inquisitio to mean searching for evidence in matters of litiga-
tion.'1 In due course, inquisitio came to mean an "intense and
detailed investigation by a magistrate who controlled the
procedure of a legal dispute, whether civil or criminal, from its
beginning to its end." 2
4. E.g., GRIFFIN FARIELLO, RED SCARE: MEMORIES OF THE AMERICAN INQUISI-
TION; AN ORAL HISTORY (1995).
5. EDWARD PETERS, INQUISITION 314 (1988).
6. Degraffenreid v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 1071, 1071 (1990) denying cert. to 883
F.2d 68 (4th Cir. 1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
7. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
8. Id. at 596.
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. Id. at 442.
11. PETERS, supra note 5, at 12.
12. Id.
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Roman law has been much admired through the centuries.
A familiar example can be found in the New Testament where
Festus, before whom the Apostle Paul stood, says, "It is not
the manner of the Romans to deliver any man, that he should
perish, before that he which is accused, have the accusers
before him, and have licence to answer for himself, concerning
the crime laid against him."1 3 Roman Law, as reflected in the
Justinian Code, served as the foundation for the legal systems
of France and Germany, along with most countries of Europe
and Latin America. 4 Thus the inquisitorial Roman structure
has been legitimized in modern legal systems.
The European Inquisition, while an historical reality, has
become mythologized in many ways. Professor Edward Peters
of the University of Pennsylvania has written a book, Inqui-
sition, 5 which seeks to set the record straight as objectively as
possible. Professor Peters chronicles the dark side of the
Inquisition, but also observes that interrogations were con-
ducted skillfully.16 He goes on to note that the "quality [ofi
witnesses was astutely assessed." 7 The Inquisition's meticu-
lous investigatory methods produced the largest and most
important body of data for any society in modern Europe.' 8
The Federal Republic of Germany, in common with most
continental systems, provides an example of a modern legal
system that is inquisitorial in nature.
[Clivil litigation in Germany ... is characterised in prac-
tice by the dominant role of the judge. It is the judge who
controls the progress of the action . . . and he is under a
positive duty to ascertain the truth to his own satisfaction.
If the evidence given in the documents admitted is not
sufficient, the judge will direct the attendance of witnesses
to give oral evidence. It is he who decides what parts of the
evidence tendered by the parties will be given orally in
support of the respective cases.' 9
13. Acts 25:16.
14. 23 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA, INTERNATIONAL EDITION Roman Law 649
(1995).
15. PETERS, supra note 5.
16. Id. at 101.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 87.
19. STEPHEN O'MALLEY & ALEXANDER LAYTON, EUROPEAN CIVIL PRACTICE 1297
(1989).
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In criminal cases, when choosing between the adversarial
and inquisitorial systems, the American courts have come
down firmly on the side of the adversarial system. On the civil
side, however, courts in the United States have adopted a
different position. American courts do not view the inquisi-
torial style of fact finding to be unconstitutional. Juvenile
courts provide an example. In the Ohio Supreme Court deci-
sion State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Solove,2 ° Justice
Herbert Brown commented, "[Jluvenile courts have adopted
unique methods of conducting their proceedings. Hearings are
informal, and based on an inquisitorial model rather than an
adversarial one."2'
A category even more relevant to the subject of this Essay
is that of administrative hearings. In United States v. Morton
Salt Co. ,22 Justice Jackson observed that administrative agen-
cies have a "power of inquisition, if one chooses to call it that,
which is not derived from the judicial function."23 In practice
many types of adjudicative procedures in the United States
today are, to some extent, inquisitorial in nature. These
procedures include many types of administrative hearings:
arbitrations, coroners' inquests, summary court martials,
congressional hearings, and institutional hearings such as
those conducted by universities.
My experience as chairman of the Ohio Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review 24 has shown me the inquisito-
rial nature of appeals conducted under the authority of the
Board of Review. The following elements of the system illus-
trate my point:
1. Hearings are controlled by the Hearing Officer rather
than by the parties, and the Hearing Officer is permit-
ted to question the witnesses.25
20. 556 N.E.2d 439 (Ohio), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 958 (1990).
21. Id. at 448.
22. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
23. Id. at 642.
24. The Ohio Unemployment Compensation Board of Review consists of three
full-time members appointed by the governor. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.06
(Anderson 1995). All hearing officers are attorneys; they consist of a chief and
assistant chief hearing officer, five senior hearing officers, fourteen hearing officers,
and three hearing officer trainees. State of Ohio Employee Position Roster (Oct. 14,
1995) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
25. See OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4146-7-02 (1994).
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2. The issues are defined by statute rather than by the
pleadings.26
3. While the Board of Review has its own procedures, they
are not the same as the Rules of Civil Procedure.
4. There is no burden of proof.2"
5. There is no jury.29
6. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the Rules of Evi-
dence.30
7. The Board of Review has statutory investigative author-
ity.31
8. Representatives of parties are not required to be admit-
ted to the practice of law. 2
I would argue that unemployment compensation (UC) hearings
in Ohio are, to a substantial degree, inquisitorial in nature.
Furthermore, although the inquisitorial system has both a
respected and discredited history, the Ohio Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review and comparable administrative
hearing bodies share in the respected side of the inquisitorial
tradition.
This system enjoys certain advantages over the adversarial
system including economy of time and money. The inquisito-
rial system processes a large number of hearings within finite
budgetary constraints. Its main advantage, perhaps, derives
from greater expedition. The delay of justice is normally less
in administrative hearings than in standard litigation.33
26. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.28(J) (Anderson Supp. 1995).
27. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4146-7-02 (1994).
28. Cunningham v. Jerry Spears Co., 197 N.E.2d 810, 814 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
29. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.28 (Anderson 1995).
30. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4146-7-02 (1994).
31. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.06 (Anderson 1995).
32. Henize v. Giles, 490 N.E.2d 585, 587 (Ohio 1986).
33. Cf. 20 C.F.R. § 650.1(b) (1995) ("Sections 303(a)(1) and (3) of the Social
Security Act require ... that State laws include provisions for methods of adminis-
tration reasonably calculated to insure full payment of unemployment compensation
when due .... The Secretary has construed these provisions to require ... provisions
for hearing and deciding appeals ... with the greatest promptness that is administra-
tively feasible."). Additionally, § 650.4 provides:
A State will be deemed to comply substantially with.., requirements.., with
respect to first level appeals, if ... the State has issued at least 60 percent of
all first level benefit appeal decisions within 30 days of the date of appeal, and
at least 80 percent of all first level benefit appeal decisions within 45 days.
20 C.F.R. § 650.4 (1995). Some question has been raised regarding these timeliness
standards, especially regarding the 20% of first-level benefit appeal decisions that are
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UC appeals are administrative hearings. But not all admin-
istrative proceedings are alike. There are both high-volume
and low-volume administrative hearing systems, and the for-
mer tend to be more inquisitorial than the latter.
An example of low-volume hearings is those conducted by
the Public Utilities Commission, while high-volume hearings
include license revocations and UC appeals. Low-volume hear-
ings tend to resemble traditional court proceedings: they are
adversarial, parties are represented by counsel, discovery is
allowed, and formal rules of procedure and evidence are
applied. On the other hand, high-volume administrative
hearings vary in certain ways from traditional adversarial
proceedings. The Ohio Board of Review is an example of a
high-volume administrative hearing system. Last year the
Board of Review disposed of 21,159 cases,34 and those hearings
typically lasted no more than forty-five minutes each.35
In the never-ending effort to balance efficiency with quality,
the forty-five-minute hearing has become standard in Ohio.
The Board's experience is that this amount of time provides
ample time to conduct a fair hearing. The time required to
prepare for hearings, to travel to hearing sites, and to write
not specifically covered. It also should be noted that the standards sometimes are not
met. Nevertheless, they have remained in place since 1972, and constitute a valid
indication of the time within which unemployment compensation appeals decisions
normally are issued. By way of comparison, the Rules of Superintendence of the
Supreme Court of Ohio recommend for common pleas courts Time Line Determina-
tions of 24 months for tort cases and 12 months for other civil cases. The average
time between receipt of appeals and first-level disposition is 39.38 days. OHIO UNEM-
PLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW, REPORT FOR MARCH 1996 (Apr. 1, 1996).
34. LABOR MKT. INFO. UNIT, OHIO BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SERVS., MA 5-130
REPORT (Oct. 1, 1994-Sept. 30, 1995). The workload of 20,367 cases includes 13,653
lower-level dispositions, 4079 higher-level dispositions, as well as 2635 additional
dispositions of other types.
35. A typical Board of Review Hearing Officers hearing schedule is this:
Monday: 8:30, 9:00, 9:45, 10:30, 11:15
Tuesday: 8:30, 9:00, 9:45, 10:30, 11:15, 1:00
Wednesday: 9:00, 9:45, 10:30, 11:15
Thursday: 8:30, 9:00, 9:45, 10:30, 11:15
Friday: 9:00, 9:45, 10:30, 11:15
See Board of Review Weekly Hearing Officer Assignments (listing the hearings
scheduled for Hearing Officer Kevin W. Thornton for Oct. 30, 1995, through Nov. 3,
1995) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). An attempt
is also made to schedule hearings that might run longer than 45 minutes at the end
of the day. This minimizes the necessity for continuances or inconvenience to parties
who might have to wait for their hearing.
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decisions are factored into the scheduling system. Other states
and other administrative hearing systems will reach different
resolutions to the issue of balance, but this is at least one
concrete example of a high-volume system in operation.
Due Process in Administrative Hearings
The founding fathers included in the Bill of Rights the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments, which provide respectively: "[n]o
person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law"36 and "[iun all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial ... and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."37
These requirements were initially applied only to actions of
the federal government. Following the Civil War, the Four-
teenth Amendment was adopted, providing that "[n]o State
shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law."38 This amendment made due process
applicable to state actions as well.
But what does "due process" mean? The case of American
Land Co. v. Zeiss 39 offers an early explanation. Chief Justice
White, writing for the Court, stated,
"Due process requires that the court ... shall have juris-
diction... and that there shall be notice and opportunity
for hearing given the parties .... Subject to these two
fundamental conditions, which seem to be universally
prescribed in all systems of law established by civilized
countries, this court has, up to this time, sustained all
state laws, statutory or judicially declared, regulating
procedure, evidence and methods of trial, and held them to
be consistent with due process of law.""
36. US. CONST. amend. V.
37. US. CONST. amend. VI.
38. US. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
39. 219 US. 47 (1911).
40. Id. at 71 (quoting Twining v. New Jersey, 211 US. 78, 110-11 (1908)).
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The Supreme Court addressed the issue of due process in
administrative hearings in the case of Goldberg v. Kelly.41
Justice Brennan's decision in Goldberg remains a significant
authority in the administrative law field. Goldberg addresses
three questions: (1) whether due process is required, (2) when
due process is required, and (3) what procedure must be fol-
lowed to satisfy due process.
There is no question that due process is required in UC
appeals. Federal law, the United States Department of Labor
(USDOL) regulations, and state law agree on this point. The
relevant Ohio statute, for example, provides the following:
When an appeal from a decision ... of the administrator
... is taken, all interested parties shall be notified and the
board ... shall, after affording such parties reasonable
opportunity for a fair hearing, affirm, modify, or reverse
the findings of fact and the decision of the administrator
• . . in the manner which appears just and proper.42
The second issue, the question of when due process is re-
quired, played a crucial role in Goldberg. The Court held that
a hearing must be held prior to the discontinuance of welfare
benefits. Justice Black excoriated this holding in his dissent:
"I feel that new experiments in carrying out a welfare program
should not be frozen into our constitutional structure. They
should be left, as are other legislative determinations, to the
Congress and the legislatures that the people elect to make
our laws."43 The question of whether a prior hearing is re-
quired does not occur at the Board of Review level because a
prior determination, by definition, has already been made by
the Administrator. Whether or not a prior hearing is required,
however, the question of timeliness remains. The Court has
41. 397 U.S. 254 (1969).
42. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.28(J) (Anderson 1995).
43. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 279. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Stewart,
also disagreed with the Goldberg decision in a companion case, as follows:
I can share in the impatience of all who seek instant solutions; there is a great
temptation in this area to frame remedies that seem fair and can be mandated
forthwith as against administrative or congressional action that calls for careful
and extended study. That is thought too slow. But, however cumbersome or
glacial, this is the procedure the Constitution contemplated.
Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 284 (1970).
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held that "[iut is ... fundamental that the right to notice and
an opportunity to be heard 'must be granted at a meaningful
time."'44 Both hearings and decisions should happen as quickly
as is administratively feasible.45
Most relevant to this Essay is Goldberg's final question of
what procedures must be followed. Standing alone, Goldberg
can be construed as requiring an adversarial judicial trial.
Subsequent Court decisions, however, have consistently re-
treated from this position. A review of these later decisions
demonstrates that the requirements of due process must
necessarily vary with the circumstances presented.
Goss v. Lopez46 goes furthest in defining minimum due pro-
cess. Several students were temporarily suspended for disrup-
tive behavior, without the benefit of a hearing.4 7 The Supreme
Court held that the students were entitled to constitutional
due process.4" The Court stated:
"Once it is determined that due process applies, the ques-
tion remains what process is due." We turn to that ques-
tion, fully realizing as our cases regularly do that the
interpretation and application of the Due Process Clause
are intensely practical matters and that "[t]he very nature
of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures
universally applicable to every imaginable situation."49
The Court further concluded that due process required "that
the student be given oral or written notice of the charges
against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the
evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present
his side of the story." ° Justice White further noted that due
process does not include the opportunity for a defendant to
secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, or to
call witnesses to verify his version of the incident.5
44. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
45. 20 C.F.R. § 650.1 (1995).
46. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
47. Id. at 567.
48. Id. at 574.
49. Id. at 577-78 (citation omitted) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972) and Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961)).
50. Id. at 581.
51. Id. at 583.
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Justice Stewart, writing for the Court in Fuentes v. Shevin,52
noted that the nature and form of hearings are open to many
potential variations.53 He observed that the subject was one for
legislation, not adjudication.54 In a footnote, the Court added
that "[ileeway remains to develop a form of hearing that will
minimize unnecessary cost and delay while preserving the
fairness and effectiveness of the hearing."55
In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermil56 the Court
held that "the pretermination 'hearing,' though necessary,
need not be elaborate."57 The Court maintained that the
"essential requirements of due process ... are notice and an
opportunity to respond. The opportunity to present reasons,
either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not
be taken is . . . fundamental."58
The majority in Wolff v. McDonnell,59 a prison disciplinary
case, noted that due process entitled inmates to advance
written notice of the claimed violation and a written statement
by the fact finders as to the evidence relied upon and the
reasons for the disciplinary action taken.6" The Court rejected
any right to confrontation and cross-examination, however,
stating that they were "not rights universally applicable to all
hearings." 1 The Court also rejected a right to counsel in this
context, observing that "[tihe insertion of counsel into the
disciplinary process would inevitably give the proceedings a
more adversary cast and tend to reduce their utility as a
means to further correctional goals."62
The Supreme Court again considered the due process re-
quirements of an administrative hearing in Richardson v.
Perales.6" In Perales, the claimant applied for social security
disability benefits and was turned down.64 The claimant relied
52. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
53. Id. at 96.
54. Id. at 96-97.
55. Id. at 97 n.33.
56. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
57. Id. at 545.
58. Id. at 546.
59. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
60. Id. at 563.
61. Id. at 567.
62. Id. at 570.
63. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
64. Id. at 393.
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heavily on Goldberg to the effect that due process requires an
effective opportunity to defend by confronting adverse wit-
nesses. 65 The Court, speaking through Justice Blackmun,
concluded that
a written report by a licensed physician who has examined
the claimant and who sets forth in his report his medical
findings in his area of competence may be received as
evidence in a disability hearing and, despite its hearsay
character and an absence of cross-examination, and despite
the presence of opposing direct medical testimony and
testimony by the claimant himself, may constitute substan-
tial evidence supportive of a finding by the hearing exam-
iner adverse to the claimant.66
In an attempt to provide overall guidance, the Supreme
Court held in Mathews v. Eldridge 7 that "'[d]ue process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protection as the partic-
ular situation demands.' 68 The Supreme Court noted that
"[in only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, has the Court held that
a hearing closely approximating ajudicial trial is necessary."69
The Court went on to endorse a balancing test:
Due process generally requires consideration of three dis-
tinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affect-
ed by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's inter-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.7 °
65. Id. at 406.
66. Id. at 402.
67. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
68. Id. at 334 (quoting Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
69. Id. at 333 (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 335. A number of lower court decisions have approved administrative
hearing procedures which are different from the panoply set forth in Goldberg. E.g.,
Taylor v. Bowland, No. C83-419 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 1993) (setting forth details of
Ohio's notice, determination, and payment provisions).
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Due Process Applied
Assuming that UC hearings are to some degree inquisitorial,
do they meet the test of compliance with due process stan-
dards? The fundamental conditions set out in Zeiss7 are
jurisdiction and notice and opportunity for hearing. UC ap-
peals meet these conditions. Ohio law provides for jurisdiction
and notice and opportunity for hearing.7 Beyond these funda-
mentals, the overview of due process requirements contained
in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy73 is
useful. In this case the Court observed that "[tihe Fifth
Amendment does not require a trial-type hearing in every
conceivable case of government impairment of private
interest.... The very nature of due process negates any
concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every
imaginable situation." 4
With this approach to due process in mind, the circum-
stances of UC appeals are worth noting. The system is a
unique blend of federal and state law, and its administration
involves participation by both federal and state agencies.75
This system has been conducting hearings in large numbers of
cases for fifty-seven years.76 Judge John J. Duffey provided a
thoughtful analysis of current UC hearing procedure:
It is apparent that a hearing under the present law is not
an adversary proceeding as in judicial actions. In the
latter, a burden of proof is imposed, reliance is placed on
the adversaries to develop the evidence, and the trier of
fact generally does not participate in developing the case.
The statute here does away with any burden of proof-at
least as used in courts to impose an obligation to
71. American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 71 (1911).
72. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.28(J) (Anderson Supp. 1995).
73. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
74. Id. at 894-95.
75. 76 AM. JUR. 3d Unemployment Compensation § 1 (1992). For a discussion of
the proper interaction between federal and state UC agencies, see Gerard Hildebrand,
Federal Law Requirements for the Federal-State Unemployment Compensation
System: Interpretation and Application, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 527, 529-34 (1996).
76. See, e.g., 1938 Op. Ohio Att'y Gen. 1989 (1938). For a thoughtful analysis of
current UC hearing procedure in Ohio, see Cunningham v. Jerry Spears Co., 197
N.E.2d 810 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
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proceed.... We think it apparent that neither party has
any procedural obligation to present its side, nor is either
subjected to the judicial requirement of a preponderance of
the evidence.... Chapter 4141, Revised Code ... now
make[s] it clear that the referee or board need not, and
perhaps frequently will not, rely upon the interested
parties to produce the information necessary for a just
decision. The board, in performing its public function of
passing on claims, is to act to insure that an adequate
basis for decision exists."
The question remains whether the system that prevails in
UC hearings comports with constitutional due process require-
ments. Goldberg set forth the following procedural protections:
1. an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner;
2. timely and adequate notice;
3. presentation of one's own arguments and evidence;
4. decisions based on evidence adduced at the hearing;
5. an explicit written statement by the decision maker of
the reasons for the determination; and
6. an impartial decision maker.78
In an effort to ensure due process, the USDOL has adopted
quality standards for UC hearings.79 These appeals perfor-
mance criteria generally reflect the due process elements
included in Goldberg with adaptations required by the nature
of UC appeals. Some of the key criteria correspond closely to
the Goldberg provisions, including
1. an opportunity to present evidence and question one's
own witnesses;
80
77. Cunningham, 197 N.E.2d at 813-14.
78. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US. 254, 268-71 (1969).
79. EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CRITERIA FOR
MEASURING THE QUALITY OF LOWER AUTHORITY APPEALS HEARINGS AND DECISIONS,
REVISED VERSION (Jan. 1995) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
80. Criterion 6: "The Hearing Officer must provide parties and representatives
with a timely opportunity to question their own witnesses." Id.
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2. an opportunity to confront and cross-examine opposing
witnesses;S1
3. a guarantee the hearing remain within the scope of the
notice;1
2
4. a guarantee of an impartial hearing officer;8 3
5. findings of fact supported by the evidence; 4 and
6. a decision made for reasons which are logical and stat-
ed. 8
5
There are additional criteria aimed at ensuring hearing
officers perform the unique responsibilities they have in this
system, especially dealing with the duty of questioning.8" The
USDOL conducts an annual survey to determine how well
states have attained the quality levels established.87
Nevertheless, certain fundamental questions remain. These
doubts stem from Justice Brennan's assumption that due
process can be provided only in an adversarial context. This
assumption explains the primacy the Goldberg decision gives
to the right of confrontation, the right to counsel, and the right
to cross-examine adverse witnesses. These rights become
slender reeds in UC hearings. This is not to say that these
rights are not valid, but the Unemployment Compensation
Board cannot rely on such procedural safeguards to ensure a
fair hearing to the extent that one would in a traditional
81. Criterion 10: "There must be an opportunity for confrontation of all opposing
witnesses." Id. Criterion 11: "The Hearing Officer must afford a timely ... opportuni-
ty to cross-examine, properly control cross-examination, and provide appropriate
assistance where necessary." Id.
82. Criterion 19: "The Hearing Officer must conduct the hearing within the scope
of the issues raised by the notice of hearing, and within the issues as finally devel-
oped at the hearing, giving proper notice of new issues." Id.
83. Criterion 22: "The Hearing Officer must conduct the hearing in an impartial
manner." Id.
84. Criterion 25: "[Tlhe findings of fact must be supported by substantial
evidence in the hearing record." Id. Criterion 26: "The Hearing Officer must make all
of the findings of fact necessary to resolve the issues and support the conclusions of
law included in the decision." Id.
85. Criterion 28: "The decision should state reasons and rationale that were
logical." Id.
86. For example, the hearing officer should use clear language (Criterion 7), ask
questions with a single point (Criterion 8), control interruptions (Criterion 14),
refrain from making gratuitous comments (Criterion 20), and assist in cross-examina-
tion where necessary (Criterion 11). See id.
87. For example, the most recent Ohio evaluation resulted in 96% of its case
passing USDOL's test for due process. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE QUALITY APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 95, at 73 fig.
111-29 (1995).
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adversarial hearing. The right of confrontation remains, but
it is weakened by the rule that hearsay is admissible in
administrative hearings.88 The right of cross-examination is
further weakened because no one is present and in a position
to conduct an effective cross-examination. While parties may
subpoena adverse witnesses, this option is not customarily
exercised. The right to retain counsel continues, but counsel
is not normally present. A recent study in Ohio, for example,
indicated that both parties were represented in only nine
percent of the cases. 89 From these facts, it is clear that the
realities of the high-volume UC system demand that addition-
al means of ensuring fair hearings need to be considered.
Board of Review
The Unemployment Compensation Board of Review's job is
to provide the opportunity for a fair hearing in an informal
context.9 ° The requirements of due process present a continu-
ing challenge. In a sense, a trial judge has a simpler job than
the hearing officer. The judge is bound by rules, including
evidentiary rules, which have been exhaustively interpreted
over the years. The hearing officer is not bound by these rules
in a technical sense, but still must give them appropriate
effect and has much less precedential guidance in doing so.
It may be that Justice Brennan in Goldberg has suggested
an agenda for hearing officers in his discussion of the services
that could be provided by counsel.9' If the parties retained com-
petent representatives, those representatives could be expected
to carry out the Goldberg agenda. In the absence of such
representation, however, the hearing officer is called upon to:
1. delineate the issues;
2. present factual contentions in an orderly manner;
88. But cf. Euclid Manor Nursing Home v. Board of Review, 501 N.E.2d 635, 638
(Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (finding harmless error where referee failed to admit hearsay
evidence which ordinarily is admitted).
89. STATE OF OHIO UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION APPEALS, OHIO UNEMPLOY-
MENT COMPENSATION APPEALS REPRESENTATION REPORT 8 (1995).
90. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.28(J) (Anderson 1995).
91. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1969).
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3. conduct effective interrogation of witnesses in lieu of
direct and cross-examination; and
4. generally safeguard the rights of the parties.
The nature of the hearing and the customary absence of
counsel place unique burdens on hearing officers to insure that
the parties receive due process. While due process remains
critical, the method of achieving it in an inquisitorial system
necessarily differs from that in an adversarial system.
Appellation
What should one call an administrative hearing that is
inquisitorial in nature? I have considered several alternatives.
One option would be to call them "inquisitorial hearings" but
the phrase's sinister connotation precludes its use. The term
"examination" is possible, but has too many other meanings to
be useful. The best solution may be to use the title of "inquest."
This term has the same meaning as "inquisition" but lacks its
sinister overtones. While normally thought of in relation to
coroners' inquests, the word has been used in connection with
a number of other administrative proceedings.
Doubtless the most historically important inquest was
instituted by William the Conqueror soon after his victory at
the Battle of Hastings in 1066. William's inquest resulted in
the Domesday Book, which inventoried substantially all the
property then existing in England.9 2 An inquest was used to
settle land titles in San Francisco following the 1906 earth-
quake.93 Inquests are venerable proceedings in the United
States, as illustrated by the case of Levy Court v. Coroner.94
This case held that, based on an old Maryland statute passed
in 1779, inquests had a fixed fee of 250 pounds of tobacco.95
There are cases in which the proceeding was alternately
referred to as an "inquest" or "inquisition."96 In other cases
inquests were utilized to determine whether real estate had
92. PETERS, supra note 5, at 38.
93. American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 62 (1911).
94. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 501 (1864).
95. Id. at 505-06.
96. See Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 430 (1901); Garrison v. City of New York,
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 196 (1874).
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escheated to the public, 7 to determine the value of land taken
for public use,98 to investigate possible misconduct by a judge,99
and to review promotion procedures at the Merchant Marine
Academy.'00 A further reason for the use of "inquest" is that it
does not preclude analysis of the high-volume administrative
hearing as inquisitorial with a substantial adversarial compo-
nent. Or perhaps "inquest" could be defined as combining
elements of both traditions. In any event, "inquest" is a good
term to describe the type of proceeding conducted by the
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review and similarly
situated decision making bodies.
Conclusion
The objective of the Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review and its hearing officers should be to conduct first-class
inquests rather than second-class trials. This can best be
achieved by recognizing the special due process burdens placed
on hearing officers by the unique nature of the UC system.
Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256 (1895).
Essex Pub. Rd. Bd. v. Skinkle, 140 U.S. 334, 341 (1891).
Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984).
Jarrett v. United States, 451 F.2d 623 (Cl. Ct. 1971).
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